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Case Comments

Decisions of International
and Foreign Tribunals
International Court of Justice
India v. Pakistan
On August 18, 1972, the International Court of Justice delivered its
Judgment in the Appeal relating to the Jurisdictionof the ICAO Council
(India v. Pakistan).
By a vote of thirteen to three, the Court rejected Pakistan's objections
on the question of its competence and found that it had jurisdiction to
entertain India's appeal.
It also held (fourteen to two) the Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization to be competent to entertain the Application and
Complaint laid before it by the Government of Pakistan on March 3, 1971,
and rejected the appeal made to the Court by the Government of India
against the decision of the Council assuming jurisdiction in those respects.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT
The Facts and the main contentions of the parties (paragraphs 1- 12 of
the Judgment). The Court has emphasized in its Judgment that it had
nothing whatever to do with the facts and contentions of the Parties
relative to the substance of the dispute between them, except in so far as
those elements might relate to the purely jurisdictional issue which alone
had been referred to it.
Under the International Civil Aviation Convention and the International
Air Services Transit Agreement, both signed in Chicago in 1944, the civil
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aircraft of Pakistan had the right to overfly Indian territory. Hostilities
interrupting overflights broke out between the two countries in August
1965, but in February 1966 they came to an agreement that there should
be an immediate resumption of overflights on the same basis as before I
August 1965. Pakistan interpreted that undertaking as meaning that
overflights would be resumed on the basis of the Convention and Transit
Agreement, but India maintained that those two Treaties had been suspended during the hostilities and were never as such revived, and that
overflights were resumed on the basis of a special r6gime according to
which they could take place only after permission had been granted by
India. Pakistan denied that any such rgime ever came into existence and
maintained that the Treaties had never ceased to be applicable since 1966.
On 4 February 197 1, following a hijacking incident involving the diversion of an Indian aircraft to Pakistan, India suspended overflights of its
territory by Pakistan civil aircraft. On 3 March 1971 Pakistan, alleging that
India was in breach of the two Treaties, submitted to the ICAO Council
(a) an Application under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article
11, Section 2, of the Transit Agreement;
(b) a Complaint under Article 11, Section 1, of the Transit Agreement. India
having raised preliminary objections to its jurisdiction, the Council declared itself competent by decisions given on 29 July 197 1. On 30 August
1971 India appealed from those decisions, founding its right to do so and
the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on Article 84 of the
Chicago Convention and Article I1, Section 2, of the Transit Agreement
(hereinafter called "the jurisdictional clauses of the Treaties").
Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Appeal (paragraphs 13-26 of
the Judgment). Pakistan advanced certain objections to the jurisdiction of
the Court to entertain the appeal. India pointed out that Pakistan had not
raised those objections as preliminary objections under Article 62 of the
Rules, but the Court observes that it must always satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction and, if necessary, go into that matter proprio motu. Pakistan
had argued in the first place that India was precluded from affirming the
competence of the Court by its contention, on the merits of the dispute,
that the Treaties were not in force, which if correct, would entail the
inapplicability of their jurisdictional clauses. The Court, however, has held
that Pakistan's argument hereon was not well founded, for the following
reasons:
(a) India had not said that these multilateral Treaties were not in force in the
definitive sense, but that they had been suspended or were not as a matter
of fact being applied as between India and Pakistan;
(b) a merely unilateral suspension of a treaty could not per se render its
jurisdictional clause inoperative;
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(c) the question of the Court's jurisdiction could not be governed by preclusive considerations;
(c) the question of the Court's jurisdiction could not be governed by preclusive considerations;

(d) parties must be free to invoke jurisdictional clauses without being made
to run the risk of destroying their case on the merits.

Pakistan had further asserted that the jurisdictional clauses of the
Treaties made provision solely for an appeal to the Court against a final
decision of the Council on the merits of disputes, and not for an appeal
against decisions of an interim or preliminary nature. The Court considers
that a decision of the Council on its Jurisdiction does not come within the
same category as procedural or interlocutory decisions concerning
time-lights, the production of documents etc., for
(a) although a decision on jurisdiction does not decide the ultimate merits, it
is nevertheless a decision of a substantive character, inasmuch as it might
decide the whole case by bringing it to an end;
(b) an objection to jurisdiction has the significance inter alia of affording one
of the parties the possibility of avoiding a hearing on the merits;
(c) a jurisdictional decision may often involve some consideration of the
merits;
(d) issues of jurisdiction can be as important and complicated as any that
might arise on the merits;
(e) to allow an international organ to examine the merits of a dispute when its
competence to do so has not been established would be contrary to
accepted standards of the good administration of justice.

With regard more particularly to its Complaint to the ICAO Council,
Pakistan had submitted that it was relying on Article 11, Section I, of the
Transit Agreement (whereas the Application relied on Article 84 of the
Chicago Convention and on Article II of Section 2 of the Transit Agreement). The point here was that decisions taken by the Council on the basis
of Article II, Section 1, are not appealable, because, unlike decisions taken
under the other two provisions mentioned above, they do not concern
illegal action or breaches of treaty but action lawful, yet prejudicial. The
Court found that the actual Complaint of Pakistan did not, at least for the
most part, relate to the kind of situation for which Section 1 of Article 11
was primarily intended, inasmuch as the injustice and hardship alleged
therein were such as resulted from action said to be illegal because in
breach of the Treaties. As the Complaint made exactly the same charges of
breach of the Treaties as the Application, it could be assimilated to the
latter for the purposes of appealability: unless that were so, paradoxical
situations might arise.
To sum up, the objections to the Court's jurisdiction based on the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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alleged inapplicability of the Treaties as such or of their jurisdictional
clauses could not be sustained. The Court was therefore invested with
jurisdiction under those clauses and it became irrelevant to consider objections to other possible bases of the Court's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, since it was the first time any matter had come to the
Court on appeal, the Court observed that in thus providing for an appeal to
the Court from the decisions of the ICAO Council, the Treaties had
enabled a certain measure of supervision by the Court of the validity of the
Council's acts and that, from that standpoint, there was no ground for
distinguishing between supervision as to jurisdiction and supervision as to
merits.
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council to entertain the merits of the case

(paragraphs 27-45 of the Judgment). With regard to the correctness of the
decisions given by the Council on 29 July 197 1, the question was whether
Pakistan's case before the Council disclosed, within the meaning of the
jurisdictional clauses of the Treaties, a disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of one or more provisions of those instruments.
If so, the Council was prima facie competent, whether considerations
claimed to lie outside the Treaties might be involved or not.
India had sought to maintain that the dispute could be resolved without
any reference to the Treaties and therefore lay outside the competence of
the Council. It had contended that the Treaties had never been revived
since 1965 and that India had in any case been entitled to terminate or
suspend them as from 1971 by reason of a material breach of them for
which Pakistan was responsible, arising out of the hijacking incident. India
had further argued that the jurisdictional clauses of the Treaties allowed
the Council to entertain only disagreements relating to the interpretation
and application of those instruments, whereas the present case concerned
their termination or suspension. The Court found that, although those
contentions clearly belonged to the merits of the dispute,
(a) such notices or communications as there had been on the part of India
from 1965- 1971 appeared to have related to overflights rather than to the
Treaties as such;
(b) India did not appear ever to have indicated which particular provisions of
the Treaties were alleged to have been breached;
(c) the justification given by India for the suspension of the Treaties in 1971
was said to lie not in the provisions of the Treaties themselves but in a
principle of general international law, or of international treaty law. Furthermore, mere unilateral affirmation of those contentions, contested by
the other party, could not be utilized so as to negative the Council's
jurisdiction.
Turning to the positive aspects of the question, the Court found that
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Pakistan's claim disclosed the existence of a disagreement relating to the
interpretation or application of the Treaties and that India's defences
likewise involved questions of their interpretation or application. In the
first place, Pakistan had cited specific provisions of the Treaties as having
been infringed by India's denial of overflight rights, while India had made
charges of a material breach of the Convention by Pakistan: in order to
determine the validity of those charges and counter-charges, the Council
would inevitably be obliged to interpret or apply the Treaties. In the
second place, India had claimed that the Treaties had been replaced by a
special r6gime, but it seemed clear that Articles 82 and 83 of the Chicago
Convention (relating to the abrogation of inconsistent arrangements and
the registration of new agreements) must be involved whenever certain
parties purported to replace the Convention or some part of it by other
arrangements made between themselves; it followed that any special
r6gime, or any disagreement concerning its existence, would raise issues
concerning the interpretation or application of those articles. Finally Pakistan had argued that, if India maintained the contention which formed the
substratum of its entire position, namely that the Treaties were terminated
or suspended between the Parties, then such matters were regulated by
Articles 89 and 95 of the Chicago Convention and Articles I and III of the
Transit Agreement; but the two Parties had divergent interpretations of
those provisions, which related to war and emergency conditions and to the
denunciation of the Treaties.
The Court concluded that the Council was invested with jurisdiction in
the case and that the Court was not called upon to define further the exact
extent of that jurisdiction, beyond what it had already indicated.
It had further been argued on behalf of India, though denied by Pakistan,
that the Council's decisions assuming jurisdiction in the case had been
vitiated by various procedural irregularities and that the Court should
accordingly declare them null and void and send the case back to the
Council for re-decision. The Court considered that the alleged irregularities, even supposing they were proved, did not prejudice in any fundamental way the requirements of a just procedure, and that whether the
Council had jurisdiction was an objective question of law, the answer to
which could not depend on what had occurred before the Council.
Declarations and separate or dissenting opinions. Judge Morozov and

Judge ad hoc Nagendra Singh (Dissenting Opinions) were unable to concur
in the Court's decision on the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council.
President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Declaration) and Judges
Petr6n and Onyeama (Separate Opinions) were unable to concur in the
Court's decision on its own jurisdiction.
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Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga (Separate Opinion) concurred in the operative clause of the Judgment but did not approve the Court's conclusion as
to its jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Council's decision on the
Complaint of Pakistan, as distinct from its Application.
Judges Lachs (Declaration), Dillard and de Castro (Separate Opinions)
added further observations.
Election of Five Members of the Court
Judges Isaac Forster (Senegal) and Andr6 Gros (France) have been
re-elected, and Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom) and Messrs.
Nagendra Singh (India) and Jos6 Maria Ruda (Argentina) have been elected, as Members of the International Court of Justice.
These judges were elected by the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council on 30 October 1972, and the Secretary-General of
the United Nations immediately communicated the results of the election
to the President of the Court. They will hold office for nine years from 6
February 1973, on which date the three newly-elected judges will take up
their duties.
The three outgoing judges are President Sir Muhammad Safrulla Kahn
(Pakistan), and Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom) and Luis
Padilla Nervo (Mexico).
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases
(United Kingdom v. Iceland: FederalRepublic of Germany v. Iceland)
On August 17, 1972, the International Court of Justice issued two
Orders, each adopted by fourteen votes to one, indicating interim measures
of protection in the FisheriesJurisdictioncases:
United Kingdom v. Iceland'
In the first of the two Orders, the Court indicates, pending its final
decision in the proceedings instituted on April 14, 1972 by the Government of the United Kingdom against the Goverment of Iceland, the following provisional measures:
I. the United Kingdom and the Republic of Iceland should each ensure that
no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute
submitted to the Court;
2. the United Kingdom and the Republic of Iceland should each ensure that
no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the other party in
'See also 6

INT'L LAW. 665

(July, 1972) and 889-95 (Oct., 1972).
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respect of the carrying out of whatever decision on the merits the Court
may render;
the Republic of Iceland should refrain from taking any measures to enforce the regulations of July 14, 1972 against vessels registered in the
United Kingdom and engaged in fishing activities in the waters around
Iceland outside the twelve-mile fishery zone;
the Republic of Iceland should refrain from applying administrative, judicial or other measures against ships registered in the United Kingdom,
their crews or other related persons, because of their having engaged in
fishing activities in the waters around Iceland outside the twelve-mile
fishery zone;
the United Kingdom should ensure that vessels registered in the United
Kingdom do not take an annual catch of more than 170,000 metric tons of
fish from the "Sea Area of Iceland" as defined by the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea as area V; and
the United Kingdom Government should furnish the Government of Iceland and the Registry of the Court with all relevant information, orders
issued and arrangement made concerning the control and regulation of fish
catches in the area.

Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland2
In the second Order, the Court indicates, pending the final decision in
the proceedings instituted on June 5, 1972 by the Federal Republic of

Germany against Iceland the following provisional measures:
The first five paragraphs of the second Order are in the same form,

mutatis mutandis, as in the first Order; and the sixth paragraph reads as
follows:
6. the Federal Republic should ensure that vessels registered in the Federal
Republic do not take an annual catch of more than 119,000 metric tons of
fish from the "Sea Area of Iceland" as defined by the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea as area V:

Unless the Court has meanwhile delivered its final judgment in the
cases, it shall, at an appropriate time before August 15, 1973, review the

matter at the request of any part in order to decide whether the foregoing
measures shall continue or need to be modified or revoked.
Chile 3
In December Of 197 1, appeals were filed by Anaconda, Kennecott and

Cerro Corporation, the three private United States copper companies
whose assets were expropriated in 1971 with a Constitutional Amendment
2

See6 INT'L LAw. 889-95 (Oct., 1972).
See also Lillich, InternationalLaw and the Chilean Nationalizations:The Valuation of
the Copper Companies, supra note p. 126; and Lowenfeld, Reflections on Expropriationand
the Future of Investment in the Americas, supra, p. 118.
3
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unanimously approved by the National Congress, seeking relief from the
decision of the Comptroller General of the Republic on the question of
compensation for the nationalization of their holdings.
On Appeal, Anaconda and Kennecott urged, in part, review of the
excess-profits deduction applicable only to Anaconda and Kennecott. Both
corporations requested the Special Copper Tribunal to decide as to its own
jurisdiction on this item, before taking cognizance of the other aspects of
the appeal. On August 11, 1972, the Tribunal decided, by a vote of four to
one, that it does not have jurisdiction over the question of excess profits.
On September 7, 1972, Kennecott Copper Company, former owner of
49 percent of the stock of Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A., announced in
New York, that "once the legal remedies in Chile are exhausted, it would
continue the defense of its interests in other countries of the world," and
that the company was placing all persons who may be concerned on notice
that it still has rights to the copper produced by El Teniente and that it
would adopt whatever measures it deemed necessary to protect such rights
in the copper or its proceeds.
In a press release issued in New York on September 12, 1972, Chilean
Copper Corporation (CODELCO) stated that Kennecott's attitude represents a new expression of disrespect on the part of the company towards
the sovereign faculty of the Government of Chile by which copper was
nationalized. CODELCO's communique added that "this claim openly
contradicts Kennecott's attitude in Chile when litigating for more than one
year before the Chilean Courts and is juridicially and morally inacceptable
to any Court in the world."
CODELCO further charged that "the absurd threat directed by Kennecott to the buyers of Chilean copper constitutes an open aggression intended to create uncertainty among Chile's usual customers, to cause
immediate economic damage to the country and to obstruct the normal
flow of its foreign trade."
Kennecott dispatched letters to the usual buyers of Chilean copper,
warning as to its ability to embargo 49 percent of the metal that they may
purchase, while CODELCO in its turn informed its customers that the
company's threats were illegal.
There was a strong reaction from all political sectors of Chile, from left
to right, to Kennecott's statement and the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies unanimously condemned the action, and the press, representing
different currents of opinion, repudiated it as an attempt against Chile's
sovereignity.
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